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
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19 JUNE 1977

AN ANALYSIS OF PROFESSIONAL MILITARY ETHICS:
THEIR IMPORTANCE, DEVELOPMENT AND INCULCATION

By

LIEUTENANT COLONEL MELVILLE A. DRISKO, JR.
INFANTRY



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US ARMY WAR COLLEGE, CARLISLE BARRACKS, PA 17013

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UNITED STATES ARMY WAR COLLEGE
MILITARY STUDIES PROGRAM PAPER

AN ANALYSIS OF PROFESSIONAL MILITARY ETHICS:
THEIR IMPORTANCE, DEVELOPMENT AND INCULCATION

INDIVIDUAL STUDY PROJECT

by

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19 June 1977

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


TABLE OF CONTENTS

	Page
ABSTRACT	1
LIST OF TABLES	iii
CHAPTER I. INTRODUCTION	1
Background	1
Purpose	6
II. METHODOLOGY	7
Survey Instrument	7
Sample Population	8
Administration of Questionnaire	10
Subjective Responses	10
Analysis Plan	10
III. EMPIRICAL FINDINGS	12
Importance of Ethical Conduct Among Army Officers	12
Effectiveness of Army Training Programs in Professional Military Ethics	17
Formalizing a Code of Professional Military Ethics	20
IV. ANALYSIS OF SUBJECTIVE COMMENTS/RECURRING THEMES	22
V. BROAD COMPARISONS WITH USAWC PROFESSIONALISM STUDY	30
Ideal vs. Actual Standards/Unethical Behaviors	31
Changing the Ethical Climate	32
"Duty, Honor, Country"	33
Formalizing a Professional Code of Ethics	35
Similarity in Narrative Written Themes	35
VI. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS	38
Importance of Ethical Conduct	38
Effectiveness of Army Training Programs	41
Formalizing Mottos and Professional Codes of Conduct	45
BIBLIOGRAPHY	48
APPENDIX A. Questionnaire	A-1
B. Computer Tabulated Results of Questionnaire	B-1

LIST OF TABLES/FIGURES

	Page
TABLE 1. Distribution of Sample Population Among the Variables of Rank, Sex, Commissioning Source and Branch Category	9
FIGURE 2. "Is the subject--ethical behavior--important?"	12
FIGURE 3. "Should Ethical Conduct be More of an Issue?"	13
FIGURE 4. "How much emphasis ...?"	14
FIGURE 5. "There should be an outside channel ..."	15
5a. USMA - Non-USMA	16
5b. Male - Female	
5c. Cbt - CS - CSS	
FIGURE 6. Effectiveness of TOE unit training programs	19
6a. USMA - Non-USMA	
6b. Cbt - CS - CSS	
6c. TOE - Faculty - Student	
TABLE 7. Recurring, Narrative Themes from Subjective Responses . . .	23
TABLE 8. Categories of Recurring Themes	24
TABLE 9. "Comparison of Subjective Themes ..."	37

I do solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will support and defend the Constitution of the United States against all enemies, foreign and domestic; that I will bear true faith and allegiance to the same, and that I take this obligation freely . . . So help me God.

US Army Officer's Commissioning Oath, (Reese)¹

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

BACKGROUND

The US Army has as its primary and ultimate purpose "the ordered application of force to resolve national political problems",² a task which has been the mission of armies throughout history. Societies have always designated a portion of their citizenry the responsibility of bearing arms and insuring their defense and continuing existence, whether those selected have been conscripted or volunteer. Armies have provided a "crises relevant" function, in that their effectiveness in performing that function has had crucial ramifications to the continued existence of the State.

Military leaders, as distinguished from those in other professional and technical vocations, are specifically charged with preparing for and directing military operations related to the defense of the society. To accomplish this, the people authorize them power and influence not allowed others -- command of large numbers of men and powerful weapons and expenditures of large amounts of money.

1 Lieutenant Colonel Thomas H. Reese, "An Officer's Oath", Military Review, January 1964, p. 4.

2 General Sir John W. Hackett, The Profession of Arms (London: The Times Publishing Company, Ltd, 1962) p.3.

Placing responsibility and power in the hands of military leaders requires an agreement of trust between the military profession and the American people. A commitment has traditionally been made by the military officer in the form of an oath - a pledge which entails a subordination of self to the greater good of others, in terms of national defense. This formal commitment involves a concept of honor, trust, and integrity which is vital to a profession or "calling". It involves leading others in life-death situations, and one in which great responsibility is placed in time of crisis.

The standards of ethical behavior which describe the conduct for Army officers are procedural guides which have been organized into general rules and principles to guide the Officer Corps. They are necessary to insure organizational self-control and professional autonomy. To be most effective for both the long and short term, these standards must be understood and internalized by each officer.

Expectations of the American people are pretty straightforward--they expect higher ethical behavior of Army officers--those in whom have been vested power and authority over others. Army officers themselves consider the subject of ethical standards an important one. They are aware of the corrosive effect ethical violations can have upon the effectiveness and reputation of the Army. Lying, cheating, and stealing can eventually pervade the entire leadership structure and undermine solidarity, esprit and the trust and commitment so necessary in military units.

Instilling ethical standards within people--inculcating values--is a difficult task. For the most part by the time an individual has reached young adulthood, his personality and value system are pretty well shaped. The socialization process which took place in the home, church and school have all strongly influenced each of us in our formative childhood and adolescent years. Changing these values is

not the purpose of the Army, but rather to reinforce the basic ethical teachings that are already present as a result of our Judeo-Christian background. Regular reinforcement of these normative ethics and moral considerations are necessary as a guide to continued high ethical behavior in the Army. An understanding must be developed as to the congruence between the elements of right and wrong learned earlier and the important responsibilities we assume as officers.

Reinforcement should neither be hit or miss, nor a one time shot. The ethical complexities of large scale organizations like the Army require a continual, systematic program of teaching, understanding, and reinforcement of the standards of conduct. The stakes are too high in the Profession of Arms to "hope it happens". Ethical issues are as critical to the Army as tactics, communications, or logistics. It's imperative that all Army officers have as firm a foundation in ethical behavior as they do in those other important military areas. Thus far, our approach to a systematic addressal of professional military ethics has been pretty spotty. Occasionally the subject will appear in the core course, or more usually, in an elective, at an Army service school. Occasionally it will be the topic of discussion in unit officer calls. But for the most part, it doesn't enjoy the same priority or emphasis as a dozen other military subjects.

The Army has never had a formalized code of professional military ethics similar to the medical or legal profession or the clergy. Instead we have relied upon the commissioning oath, the Armed Forces Code of Conduct and an informal motto, "Duty, Honor, Country". All three have had value to the Officer Corps. The first, the commissioning oath, establishes a frame of reference for the officer aspirant as he enters the Profession of Arms. Unfortunately, the oath is only sworn to once in a lifetime. The Code of Conduct provides a guide to American military combatants--expected behavior when confronting an enemy on the battlefield. The Code of Conduct

is a valuable document under these circumstances, but these circumstances are relatively rare for most Army officers. More frequent are the years of peacetime duty at the Pentagon, in service schools, and in tactical units around the world, daily facing the challenges of readiness reporting, ARTEPS, OERs, and AGIs.

With respect to "Duty, Honor, Country", we find a nice ring to those words--they fit together. The real question is the extent to which each of them is understood and can be sophisticatedly articulated by every member of the Officer Corps.

Traditionally, "Duty" has been described as a dedication to service and loyalty. It has meant a sense of fidelity and responsibility for one's own actions and those for whom he's responsible.³ It has entailed discriminating between blind, unreasoning demands of the situation and those rationally thought out beforehand. The concept of "Honor" is perhaps the most critical because it is an internalized moral and ethical system which should be the underpinnings of all officers' behavior. Its underlying values are truth-telling, honesty, and integrity.⁴ Implicit in "honor" is a sense of trust within the Officer Corps. Subordinates must be able to trust their leaders implicitly. The trust must be mutual if the unity and cohesion which are so crucial to combat effectiveness are to be developed. Requirements of combat demand high standards of honor, integrity, loyalty, and justice. The same applies to the military institution as a whole in carrying out the heavy responsibilities entrusted to it by the host society.⁵

3 Colonel Samuel H. Hayes and Lieutenant Colonel William N. Thomas, Taking Command, Harrisburg, PA, Stackpole Books, p. 49.

4 Captain Wesley K. Clark, "The Flusive Concept of Honor", Armor, Sept-Oct 1971, p. 22-25.

5 Colonel Samuel H. Hayes, Essays on American Military Institutions, (West Point: Office of MP&L, 1969) p. 33.

The most altruistic aspect of the motto, and the entire Profession of Arms, is the unswerving allegiance to Country. It has meant a "dedicated patriotism" and a mystical allegiance to the national identity, political conservatism, and loyalty to the national sovereign.⁶ Military professionals are responsible for national security, and are constantly developing rationale for the national defense system. The sacredness and perpetuation of Country provide such rationale.⁷

One can hardly take issue with "Duty, Honor, Country" in the above contexts. The point at issue might be, however, how these value definitions have been affected as a result of contemporary experiences such as Vietnam, Watergate, West Point honor scandals, differing perceptions of national security (e.g., Korea), etc. The ultimate question is not that the values have changed for the better or worse, but whether there is a sufficient understanding of them in the first place so that comparative evaluations and judgments can be made, discussed, and articulated in an intelligent manner. For the moment, with the exception of a rudimentary course at USMA, "Duty, Honor, Country" is not really discussed or understood in sufficient depth by the Officer Corps, who generally accept it as the informal Army motto. An education process might be the answer to this problem.

6 Morris Janowitz and Roger Little, Sociology and the Military Establishment, (New York: Russell Sage, 1965), p. 111.

7 Bengt Abrahamson, "The Ideology of an Elite: Conservatism and National Insurity", in Jacques Van Doorn, Armed Forces and Society: Sociological Essays, (The Hague: Mouton, 1968) p. 72.

PURPOSE

The purpose of this preliminary study is to examine three essential areas concerning professional military ethics. The first area is the general climate of ethical behavior among Army officers today. Critical to this perception is the importance of ethical behavior and whether the subject should be more of an issue in the Army than it is. The contemporary ethical climate also includes action taken against, and emphasis placed upon, officers who act unethically.

The second area deals with the effectiveness of training programs throughout the Army in professional military ethics. This study focuses on those programs in the Army service schools and in TOE units. The inquiry is to their effectiveness and appropriate level of emphasis as perceived by student officers, faculty members, and officers assigned to TOE units in CONUS.

The final area deals generally with the "Duty, Honor, Country" motto and its acceptability and effectiveness within the Officer Corps. Also addressed is the perceived need to formalize behavioral standards into a professional military code of ethics. Finally, respondents were queried about the need for a communications channel, outside the chain of command, for reporting unethical conduct by peers and superiors.

"Professional ethics start with . . . enlightened leadership, demonstrated by moral courage, and your boss supporting such an attitude!"

Cpt, USMA graduate, Student (USAIS)
Male, Combat Arms

CHAPTER II

METHODOLOGY

To gather data for this study a representative sampling of company and field grade Army officers was selected. While the selection was not entirely random (i.e., an equal chance of any member of the Officer Corps to be selected) it does provide adequate data (3-4% of the total population in every demographic category) to examine officer's perceptions on the subject of professional military ethics.

SURVEY INSTRUMENT

A 34 question survey was developed in order to gather quantitative data. Questions 1 through 10 are biographic in nature, and by design, are similar to those demographic questions found in the 1970 USAWC Professionalism Study. While this current study is not a replication of the USAWC Professionalism Study, if similarities or significant differences appear they will be analyzed, and broad, general comparisons made, as appropriate (See Chapter V, "Comparison w/USAWC Professionalism Study). For purposes of this preliminary investigation only the variables of rank (Question #1), source of commission (Question #2), sex (Question #3), branch category (Question #4), and current assignment (Question #6) will be factored against the remaining substantive questions dealing with military ethics.

Questions #11 through #25 deal with the issues of ethical behavior in the Officer Corps, how often it occurs, what actions are taken, and what actions should be taken. The key questions among this group that directly relate in scope to the study are Question #11 - "Is the subject of ethical behavior important?", Question #12 - "Should ethical conduct be more of an issue?", Question #20 - "Does the Army take appropriate action against unethical behavior?", and Question #21 - "How much emphasis should the Army place on taking action against unethical behavior?". Each of these questions will be analyzed in detail.

Questions #26 through #29 deal with the effectiveness of training programs on military ethics in Army Service Schools and TOE units, the second major area of this study.

Questions #30 through #32 address the informal code "Duty, Honor, Country", and the issue of a formalized professional code of ethics. An open ended question is provided in Question #34, soliciting write-in comments by respondents that may have been provoked as a result of filling out the questionnaire. A content analysis of these ideas/comments is provided in Chapter IV, "Subjective Comments/Recurring Themes. "

SAMPLE POPULATION

The focus of this study is on the US Army Officer Corps, company and field grade. The sample included a total of 2215 officers, located at 10 different installations in CONUS. These installations were selected so that the sample population would include a proportionate representation of FORSCOM and TRADOC unit officers, combat, combat support and combat service support officers, male and female officers, USMA officers and other commissioning source officers. Respondents include student officers from three different officers basic courses and four

advanced courses, the C&GSC students at Fort Leavenworth and the US Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, and faculty at all those institutions. Representation from TOE units include respondents from an airborne division (82d Airborne), infantry division (1st Inf Div) and a mechanized infantry division (4th Inf Div), as well as respondents from TDA units located at those installations. The study sample is proportionately compared to the entire officer corps in each category as reflected below:

Table 1
Distribution of Sample Population among the Variables of Rank, Sex,
Commissioning Source, and Branch Category

<u>Category</u>	<u>(N)</u>	<u>%*</u>	<u>Category</u>	<u>(N)</u>	<u>%</u>
All officers	(2215)	3%	Male	(1975)	3%
2LT	(469)	4%	Female	(226)	11%**
1LT	(278)	3%	USMA	(318)	3%
CPT	(610)	2%	Non-USMA	(1897)	3%
MAJ	(457)	3%	Combat	(1023)	3%
LTC	(280)	3%	Cbt Spt	(622)	3%
COL	(121)	3%	Cbt Svc Spt	(541)	2%
Co Grade	(1357)	3%			
Fld Grade	(858)	3%			

*Indicates % of total category in the Army; e.g., 2LT, 4% means that 4% of all 2LT's in the Army were sampled.

**The proportionate sample of women officers is high (11%) in order to insure a statistically significant number for a relatively small overall population (2126 female officers total).

ADMINISTRATION OF QUESTIONNAIRE

Questionnaires were hand carried in bulk by the study project officer to 7 of the 10 military installations. (Coordination with the remaining 3 - Ft. Lee, Ft. Wadsworth and Ft. McClellan was done by telephone and mail.) Each installation designated a survey control officer for the purpose of administering the questionnaire, usually an officer from the Post DPCA/GI section. Questionnaires were randomly administered by each project officer throughout their installations so that each demographic variable (See Questions #1, 2, 3, 4, 6 on Questionnaire and Table 1) was representative, except the female sample which was considerably larger because of the small total female officer population in the Army. Of the 2500 questionnaires distributed, 2215 answer sheets were returned--an 89% response rate.

SUBJECTIVE RESPONSES

Six hundred officers of those responding also wrote in subjective comments in the space provided in Question #34--a 26% write-in rate. (Those comments will be discussed in Chapter IV of this study.)

ANALYSIS PLAN

Questions #1 through #33 of the questionnaire were designed to be answered on an optical scan answer sheet which allowed for computer-assisted analysis, which produced statistical data in standardized formats of frequency, distribution, average standard deviations and means.

To analyze the 12 questions (#11, 12, 20, 21, 23, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32) considered critical to the three areas of interest to this study the Chi-square test of the independence of categorical variables was used as the appropriate statistical test. Results of these analyses are shown in Chapter III,


Empirical Findings, and significant differences among the demographic variables are specifically identified.

The written responses to Question #34 were content analyzed to identify central ideas or themes which were pervasive--those issues most discussed by the 600 respondents. This was a manual, time-consuming operation, but produced some 25 specific issues which fit into several larger, central categories. Responses were compared with company and field grade officers, and male-female officers to determine differences or directional tendencies.

A Proposed Oath, Maj, ROTC graduate,
82d Abn Div, Male, Combat Arms


EMPIRICAL FINDINGS

The most critical, preliminary question underlying this study is whether or not the "subject of ethical behavior is an important issue for Army Officers today" (Question #11). If indeed there had been a strong disagreement with this position, it would have been pointless to go further; it would have been a non-issue. Overwhelmingly, however, the 2200+ officer respondents agreed that this is an important contemporary subject.



The subject was found "Moderately" to "Greatly Important" by 94% of the respondents, with only 5% finding it "Unimportant". A further examination as to differences in this perception relating to rank, sex, source of commission, branch category and type of assignment showed uniform responses. All were high in the "Important" category, with no significant differences noted among those variables.


The follow-on question as to the perceived importance of the subject is whether. . . "based on behaviors observed in fellow officers, ethical conduct should be more of an issue than it is" (Question #12). This point was rated "Moderately" to "Strongly Agree" by 77% of the respondents, with 16% "Moderately" to "Strongly Disagree". Field grade officers (82%) agreed more strongly with the statement than company grade officers (74%), a difference shown to be significant by the Chi-square test ($11.52 > 3.84$, 95% assurance). There is a relationship between officer's rank. This relationship can be seen quite clearly in the figure below. Except for a slight decrease in the percentage of Colonels, the rate of "Agree" responses increases as rank increases.




Question #20 asked respondents how often they thought the Army took appropriate action against officers who act unethically. It was felt by 78% that only "Rarely" or "Occasionally" was action taken; 11% felt it was "Usually" or "Moderately Often" taken. Field grade officers (81%) felt slightly stronger than company grade officers (76%) that the Army rarely or only occasionally takes appropriate action dealing with unethical conduct, but the difference is not enough to make rank a dependent variable in this case.

$$(\chi^2 = 1.65 < 3.48)$$


A follow-on question to the one above asked the amount of emphasis the Army should place on taking disciplinary action against officers who act unethically (Question #21). Of all officer respondents, 64% felt the emphasis should be "Great" to "Very Great"; 33% felt it should be "Slight" to "Moderate". A statistically significant relationship exists in the response to this question depending on rank between company grade (61% Great/Very Great) and field grade (70% Great/Very Great) ($\chi^2 = 19.3$). The relationships of rank is also significant with respect to each intermediate grade between 2LT and Colonel ($\chi^2 = 34.14$). The higher the rank, the greater the need for more emphasis on disciplinary action. Figure #4 clearly shows this.



The subject of "an outside channel, besides the chain of command, for reporting unethical conduct by peers and superiors" (Question #23) evoked considerable response and many divergent opinions. Of all respondents, 38% "Moderately" to "Strongly Agreed", while 46% "Moderately" to "Strongly Disagreed" with a channel outside of the chain of command; 16% were "Undecided". Company grade officers (43%) feel considerably stronger in this respect -- "Moderately" to "Strongly Agree" than do field grade officers (30%). The difference is statistically significant to the .05 level ($\chi^2 = 59.73$) pointing out a dependent relationship between the need for an outside channel of communication and rank. The difference remains statistically significant in an examination of the specific rank categories between 2LT and COL ($\chi^2 = 93.88$), as the figure below portrays. Rank is inversely proportional to the perception of a need for an outside channel of communication.



West Point graduates (25%) on active duty in the Army "Agreed" with the need for an outside channel to a significantly lesser degree than non-USMA graduates (40%) ($\chi^2 = 31.29$). Other statistically significant differences were found between Male (35% "Agreed") and Female officers (59% "Agree") ($\chi^2 = 52.31$), and among branch categories---Combat Arms officers (33% "Agree"), Combat Support officers (39% "Agree") and Combat Service Support officers (46% "Agree") ($\chi^2 = 22.38$). Not surprising, but very statistically significant, is the difference in responses of the current US Army Chaplain's Advanced Course class. This group is comprised of nearly all field grade officers, most of whom are Lieutenant Colonels. Of the chaplain respondents, 58% "Moderately" to "Strongly Agreed" to a need for an outside communications channel, compared to the overall officer "Agree" response of 38%, and a field grade "Agree" response of 30%. These are shown on Figure 5a-5c below.



EFFECTIVENESS OF ARMY TRAINING PROGRAMS IN PROFESSIONAL MILITARY ETHICS

The second major issue of this study is the effectiveness of current Army training programs in developing concepts of trust, honor and integrity in the officer corps. Three Army service schools were surveyed, representing the combat arms (Infantry: Ft. Benning, GA), combat support (Engineer: Ft. Belvoir, VA) and combat service support (Quartermaster: Ft. Lee, VA). Respondents from these schools included students, staff and faculty from both the officer basic courses and officer advanced courses. The advanced course students of the USA Chaplains School (Ft. Wadsworth, NY) were also surveyed, as were the students, staff and faculty of the US Army Command and General Staff College (Ft. Leavenworth, KA) and the US Army War College (Carlisle Barracks, PA). TOE and TDA officers surveyed were from units assigned to Ft. Bragg, NC, Ft. Benning, GA, Ft. Carson, CO, and Ft. Riley, KA.

Training program effectiveness measurements were focused in two areas: how effective training programs were in Army Service Schools and in TOE units; and secondly, how much emphasis should be placed in teaching professional military ethics in both Service Schools and in TOE units.

Question #26 specifically asks how effective training programs are in the Army School System. Of the 2208 officers who responded, 65% felt that current programs in Army Service Schools were either "Moderately/Very Ineffective", or "Non-Existent". Overall, 35% felt the programs were "Moderately" to "Very Effective". Significant differences were found in comparing company and field grade responses, USMA and non-USMA responses, and the responses of TOE unit officers compared to students and faculty of Service Schools.


Company grade officers felt that Service School training programs were considerably less effective (69%) than did field grade officers (59%). This difference is significant to the .05 level ($\chi^2 = 24.51$), as was the difference between USMA graduates (72%) and non-USMA graduates (64%) ($\chi^2 = 9.34$). The follow-up question, #27, which asked how much emphasis should be placed on teaching professional military ethics in Service Schools showed that more than 3/4 of all the respondents (77%) felt there should be "More" to "Much More" emphasis than there presently is. Only 5% felt there should be less emphasis. There were no significant differences in this issue in terms of rank, sex, course of commission, branch, or type of current assignment.

Similar questions, #28 and #29, were asked of the respondents with regard to training programs in TOE units. Of all respondents, 66% felt that TOE unit training programs were "Moderately Ineffective" to completely "Non-Existent", which compares closely with the responses described above on the effectiveness of Service School programs (65%). However, only 10% responded that TOE units had "Moderately" to "Very Effective" TOE unit programs, compared again to Question #26, when 35% felt that Service School programs were effective. Furthermore, there were some significant differences among several of the officer sub-groups. Of the USMA graduate respondents, 80% felt that these TOE programs were "Moderately Ineffective" to "Non-Existent", while only 8% felt they were "Moderately" to "Very Effective". Only 64% of the non-USMA graduate officers felt these programs were ineffective; 11% felt they were effective. The difference between these 2 groups is statistically significant ($\chi^2 = 7.16$).

A difference in perception also exists between male and female officers, however, the high incidence of "Don't Know" responses among female officers (37%) precludes a Chi-Square level of significance. Males felt much more strongly that TOE programs were ineffective (59%), compared to female officers (44%).

Slight differences were found among the branch categories. Of the combat arms officers, 72% felt the programs were "Moderately Ineffective" to "Non-Existent", compared to 65% of the combat support officers and 58% of the combat service support officers, however, they were not statistically significant ($\chi^2 = 1.71 < 5.99$).

Strongest condemnation of the TOE unit ethical training programs, however, came from TOE unit officers themselves. Of the TOE officers, 75% felt that their programs were "Moderately Ineffective" to "Non-Existent", compared to 68% of officers on school faculties and 64% of student officers. ($\chi^2 = 5.07$). A graphical resume' of the significant differences in responses to Question #28 are shown in Figure 6.



As a follow-up question, Question #29 asked how much emphasis should be placed on teaching professional military ethics in TOE units. Officers overall felt that there should be "More" to "Much More" emphasis (68%) in professional military ethics in TOE units. Only 5% felt that there should be "Less" emphasis.

FORMALIZING A CODE OF PROFESSIONAL MILITARY ETHICS

The final issue to be examined in this study deals with the acceptability and effectiveness of the informal Army code "Duty, Honor, Country", and whether or not the Officer Corps feels there is a need for something even more formalized, to define normative, ethical behavior.

Question #30 asked if the informal code, "Duty, Honor, Country" was acceptable to the officer corps. Nearly 3/4 of the respondents agreed (73%) with this contention. While 16% disagreed, 11% were undecided. Significant relationships were found in responses compared to rank and source of commission. Company grade officer accepted "Duty, Honor, Country" to a significantly greater degree than did field grade officers. (Company grade: 75% "YES", 14% "NO"; Field Grade: 70% "YES", 20% "NO") ($\chi^2 = 13.72$). Similarly USMA graduates had a higher degree of acceptance for "Duty, Honor, Country" than did the non-USMA graduates. (USMA: 83% "YES", 10% "NO"; Non-USMA: 71% "YES", 18% "NO") ($\chi^2 = 14.11$).

While there was a high degree of acceptance for "Duty, Honor, Country", as shown above, when officers were asked about the effectiveness of "Duty, Honor, Country" in promoting ethical behavior, the results were not as optimistic (Question #31). Only 37% of the respondents felt that the code was "Moderately" to "Very Effective". Another 47% felt that the code was "Moderately" to "Very Ineffective", and 16% were undecided. Significant differences were found again between USMA and non-USMA responses. USMA graduates felt that "Duty, Honor, Country" was more effective in promoting ethical behavior than did non-USMA

graduates. (USMA: 51% "Effective", 35% "Ineffective" - non-USMA graduates: 35% "Effective"; 49% "Ineffective") ($\chi^2 = 30.73$).

Finally, respondents were asked if they thought the Army should have a formalized professional code of ehtics. The overall response was 2 to 1 in favor of a formalized code (55% "YES", 27% "NO", 18% "Undecided"). There were significant differences in responses to this question depending on the rank of respondents. No differences were found with regard to sex, source of commission, or branch category. Support for a formalized code of ethics in the Army varied inversely with rank; i.e., the more senior the officer, the less favorable he/she was toward a formalized code. This was true of each rank, 2LT through COL, with the exception of 1LT. Significant differences were also found by combining these sub-groups, and comparing company grade officers with field grade officers. Field grade officers were less favorably inclined toward a formal code than company grade officers ($\chi^2 = 14.56$). There is also a relationship between support for a formal code and current assignment. Both TOE unit officers and student officers were significantly more in favor of a formal code (TOE unit officers: 56% "YES", 27% "NO"; Student officers: 56% "YES", 25% "NO") than officer faculty members (48% "YES", 35% "NO") ($\chi^2 = 9.77$).

As a sub-group, chaplains (all field grade) were the strongest supporters of a formal code (67% "YES", 17% "NO", 16% "Undecided"), and COLs were least supportive (42% "YES", 47% "NO", 11% "Undecided").

"If the boss is flakey, what the hell can you do?"

Major, ROTC graduate, Student,
USC&GSC, Male, Combat Arms

CHAPTER IV

ANALYSIS OF SUBJECTIVE COMMENTS/RECURRING THEMES

The final item (Question #34) on the study questionnaire asked respondents to ". . . write any ideas or comments (they) thought might be helpful on the subject of professional military ethics, Army Training Programs that deal with ethical conduct, or any other subject that may have surfaced while (they) filled out the questionnaire." A total of 600 officers responded to this item, listing a total of 1119 comments. Their comments were content analyzed by the study project officer. Twenty-five predominant, recurring themes emerged. They are listed in Table 7 in order of frequency.

These were further refined down to four categories: (1) Ethics and Early Socialization; (2) Contemporary Ethical Problems; (3) Proposed Solutions; (4) A Professional Code. The issues addressed in "Problems" and "Proposed Solutions" were those most discussed. Comments on these two issues accounted for 73% of the overall comments ("Problems" 36%; "Solutions" 37%). The remaining two categories were also equally divided. Table 8 describes the distribution.

TABLE 7
RECURRING, NARRATIVE THEMES FROM SUBJECTIVE RESPONSES

<u>Theme</u>	<u>No. Responses</u>
1. Ethical instruction needed throughout the Army	115
2. Ethics must start at highest levels	81
3. Need for a formal code	78
4. OERs/Career Survival	77
5. Leaders must set example	71
6. Lack of integrity in senior officers	63
7. Pressure on junior officer/unrealistic standards	59
8. Readiness Reports inaccuracies	52
9. More emphasis on ethics	51
10. Ethics can't be taught	42
11. Don't need new codes; enforce ones we have	41
12. "Can-do" syndrome' "Zero defects"	41
13. Tell the boss what he wants to hear	40
14. Need to create a healthy environment	38
15. Ethics are vague/early socialization	35
16. More selective in commission/pre-commissioning training	33
17. Cover up to look good	31
18. Can't distinguish between military and civ/personal ethics	29
19. Ethics are dictated by society	25
20. Ethical instruction should be realistic	25
21. "Cover your ass" syndrome	21
22. Use the chain of command to enforce	21
23. No "Freedom to fail"	19
24. Code is too USMA-oriented	17
25. Ethics are relative/dual standards	14
	<u>1119</u>

TABLE 8

CATEGORIES OF RECURRING THEMES

<u>Categories</u>	<u>No. Responses</u>
I. <u>Ethics and Early Socialization</u> : "Ethics can't be taught"; "Ethics vague/early socialization"; "Ethics dictated by society"; "Ethics relative/dual standards"; "Can't distinguish - mil & civ/personal ethics."	145 (13%)
II. <u>Contemporary Ethical Problems</u> : "Cover Your Ass" syndrome; "Tell superiors what they want to hear"; "Pressure on junior officers"; "Lack of integrity in senior officers"; "OERs/Career survival"; "No freedom to fail"; "Readiness Reports"; "Cover up to look good"; "Can-do - Zero defects syndrome."	403 (36%)
III. <u>Proposed Solutions</u> : "Realistic ethical instruction"; "Ethics must start at highest levels"; "More selection in commissioning/precommissioning training"; "Ethical instruction needed throughout Army"; "Leaders must set example"; "More emphasis on ethics"; "Need to create healthy environment."	414 (37%)
IV. <u>A Professional Code</u> : Don't need new codes; enforce ones we have; "Use the chain of command to enforce"; "Need for a formal code"; "Code is too USMA oriented."	157 (14%)
	1119 (100%)

- ETHICAL INSTRUCTION NEEDED THROUGHOUT ARMY. Formal instruction should be given in professional military ethics throughout the Army Service School System and in regular units. It should be systematic, reinforcing and institutionalized at all levels, beginning in the Basic Course.

- ETHICS MUST START AT THE HIGHEST LEVELS. If the most senior officers in the Army act unethically, it can permeate the entire officer corps. General officers are especially visible in this respect.

- NEED FOR A FORMAL CODE. There needs to be a written code of military ethics or officers creed so that there will be a guide for each officer which explicitly sets out the ethical objectives of the military profession.

- OERs/CAREER SURVIVAL. Efficiency reports have to be near max just to survive; must be max to succeed. One little "nick" on an OER will "do an officer in" professionally. Everybody must be outstanding!

- LEADERS MUST SET THE EXAMPLE. Role model for ethical behavior by leaders, at all levels, is critical. Soldiers learn as much from watching their leaders as they do from classes. Too much "do as I say, not as I do" by Army leaders taking advantage of their positions.

- LACK OF INTEGRITY AMONG SENIOR OFFICERS. Perception by subordinates that senior officers will do anything to look good and get ahead. Mission-type orders which imply, "I don't care how you do it, just get it done!" Exposure of senior officers involved in illicit activities have a demoralizing impact on the rest of the officer corps.

- PRESSURE ON JUNIOR OFFICERS/UNREALISTIC STANDARDS. Duty priorities misplaced. Everything to be done in the unit is first priority--even to the exclusion of families. Overly competitive spirit of commanders causes everything to be compared to other units, and the need to always be first!

- READINESS REPORT INACCURACIES. Subjective evaluations made by commanders upgrading the readiness status of their unit with little to base it on. Some intentional manipulation of the readiness statistics, bringing the percentage figures up to acceptable levels. Perception by junior leaders of the dishonesty and deceit perpetuated each month by the "peaking" of the Readiness Report on the 20th.

- MORE EMPHASIS ON ETHICS. Emphasis needed in training programs, issues involving unethical conduct, discussions about the military code of ethics, more articles/essays in military periodicals, more emphasis and direction by the leadership of the Army in this area.

- ETHICS CAN'T BE TAUGHT. To be ethical one must do more than just go to ethics classes. Ethical conduct comes from within a person; it can't be shoved down his throat. It is a very long term process.

- DON'T NEED NEW CODES; ENFORCE ONES WE HAVE. We already have sufficient codes (Officers' Commissioning Oath, Code of Conduct) and Army Regulations dealing with ethical conduct and violations thereof. We don't need to add new ones--just enforce the provisions of the ones we already have.

- "CAN DO"/"ZERO DEFECTS" SYNDROME. The "positive" thinking officer who lets his boss know his unit can do anything and everything. Everything will get done, and it all must be perfect, regardless of the work involved or capacity of the unit. Many unit mottos tend to reinforce the "Can Do" syndrome; "Airborne, All the Way", "No Mission Too Difficult", "No Sacrifice Too Great", "Duty First", etc.

- TELL THE BOSS WHAT HE WANTS TO HEAR. Subordinates don't want to "rock the boat". Layers of bureaucracy stifle creative ideas and new approaches to problems. Give the boss the good news only; the staff will take care of the bad news for him.

- NEED TO CREATE A HEALTHY ENVIRONMENT. Sustained high ethical conduct can only survive in a healthy environment. The prevailing attitudes must be those that foster honesty, openness, integrity. Officers need to be shown that success can be gained this way, instead of by short term cutting corners.

- ETHICS ARE VAGUE/EARLY SOCIALIZATION. Concepts of ethical behavior are learned long before an officer enters the Army--he learns them at home, in school and in church as he grows up. Ethics are both vague and complex--difficult to apply uniformly to all officers.

- MORE SELECTION IN COMMISSIONING/PRE-COMMISSIONING TRAINING. More discrimination and selectivity as early as possible. Weed out undesirables before they are commissioned. Begin formal training programs in military ethics early on, in ROTC, OCS, USMA core curriculum.

- COVER UP TO LOOK GOOD. Perception by subordinates of their leader's behavior. Covering up discrepancies that the subordinates know exist, in order to look good at readiness reporting time, during tests, inspections, etc. Short term unethical behavior which has long term ramifications on readiness and unit effectiveness.

- CAN'T DISTINGUISH BETWEEN MILITARY AND CIV/PERSONAL ETHICS. It is difficult to separate conduct on duty (military ethics) from conduct elsewhere. Is there a difference between civilian morality/ethics and that expected of an Army officer? Should there be a difference? If so, what should the difference be?

- ETHICS ARE DICTATED BY SOCIETY. Normative behavior is defined by the outside American society. Mores and values change, sometimes quickly (as during the Vietnam War). The Army must exist within the society, therefore, its basic values must be in tune with that of society. Establishing ethical standards for

officers which are higher than, or different from the American society, is unrealistic and unworkable.

- ETHICAL INSTRUCTION MUST BE REALISTIC. Instruction needs to begin early in an officer's career, be systematic and pregressive, and be relevant to the problems that are faced each day. Lectures. officer's calls and Character Guidance classes are inadequate, to inculcate ethical values. Instructors must be credible, instruction must relate to the Officer Corps, decisions must be made individually by each person, and not made/enforced by the commander alone.

- "COVER YOUR ASS" SYNDROME. Interpreted by most as a "cop-out" to standing up and being straightforward. Every action has a caveat or fall-back position so that one is never caught short. Generally felt to be a position of abrogating the responsibilities which have been entrusted to a leader, and one which engenders little respect or trust from others--the "CYA" officer will let you sink before he goes down.

- USE THE CHAIN OF COMMAND TO ENFORCE. If the chain of command took responsibility and did its job, unethical behaviors by officers would be identified and appropriate action--either administrative or disciplinary--would be taken. More "stovepipes" are unnecessary if the chain of command discharged its responsibilities accordingly, and has the moral courage to take action.

- NO "FREEDOM TO FAIL". There are no allowances for failure or learn from one's mistakes--they are seldom condoned. "One mistake can ruin a career". Competition is so keen for promotions, command selections, service schools and key assignments that mistakes, anytime in a career, can be diastorous.

- "DUTY, HONOR, COUNTRY" CODE IS TOO USMA-ORIENTED. "Duty, Honor, Country" motto originated at West Point, and is emblazoned on its buildings, class rings, etc. While some officers also accept it as the informal Army code as well, others don't--believing it's West Point's only, and not theirs.

- ETHICS ARE RELATIVE/DUAL STANDARDS. Ethical standards vary, depending upon the time and circumstances. Dual standards are seen to exist between Army officers and the rest of society, and even between senior officers and those of lesser rank and privilege. Another example of the "Do as I say, and not as I do" syndrome.

"However nebulously defined, ideal values for the officer corps DO exist. Officers share a common view of the professional prescriptions and proscriptions which define how an officer is supposed to think, evaluate, decide and act."

Study on Military Professionalism,
US Army War College, 1970

CHAPTER V

BROAD COMPARISONS WITH USAWC PROFESSIONALISM STUDY

The US Army War College was directed by the Chief of Staff, US Army in 1970 to conduct a study to assess the professional climate of the Army, identify problem areas, and formulate corrective actions. The major portion of the study data base was derived from interviews, seminars and questionnaires conducted and administered in May 1970. Sample population (415) consisted of Army officers who were students or faculty members at the US Army Chaplain's School, advanced courses at Forts Benning, Eustis, Knox and Sill, the C&GSC at Ft. Leavenworth and the class of 1970 at the US Army War College. The sample was not designed to be a statistical representation of the entire officer corps.

Study methodology was to determine what the ideal professional climate was--in terms of ideal values and standards--compared to the actual professional climate in the Army. Analyses were made of the responses to these questions, comparing the demographic variables of rank, source of commission, branch, educational level, etc. Respondents were also asked to note the degree of variation, between ideal and actual standards, in the performance of 34 different functions common to the officer's job and how important these variances were to the Army.

Specific comparisons between the USAWC Professionalism Study and this study of professional ethics cannot be made because one is not a longitudinal replication of the other. However, there are a number of areas in both studies which are common enough to make broad comparisons, gain some insights and note commonalities, despite a seven year interval between the two.

IDEAL vs. ACTUAL STANDARDS/UNETHICAL BEHAVIORS

The USAWC Professionalism Study showed that officers of all grades perceived a significant difference between the ideal standards and the actual or operative standards of the officer corps. (While the study as a whole showed that the content of the different responses depicting the climate was strikingly uniform and independent of the variables of grade, branch, education, and source of commission, there was a statistically significant relationship between the discernable difference in ideal and actual standards and rank. The greater the rank, the less the perceived variance.)

This present study on Professional Military Ethics, hereafter referred to as the PME Study, reflected similar findings. All officers felt uniformly and very strongly that the issue of ethical behavior among the officer corps was an important issue (94%). Furthermore, they felt that based on the behaviors of fellow officers they had observed, it should be even more of an issue (77%). (Surprisingly, field grade officers felt more strongly about this than did company grade officers.) The PME study also found that the Army is perceived to rarely or only occasionally take appropriate action against officers who act unethically. Officer respondents felt strongly (64%) that there should be much more emphasis placed on disciplinary action against these unethical officers

COMPARITIVE STANDARDS OF SUPERIORS, SUBORDINATES AND PEERS

The USAWC Professionalism Study found the tendency of officers at all grades was to be more critical of their subordinates than their superiors or peers in evaluating the difference between the actual and ideal standard in ethical behavior. The study also showed that the lower the grade, the more critical the evaluations.

The PME study, on the other hand, in a somewhat related question, found a different relationship. When asked, ". . . which group of officers tended to behave most unethically," the response from each grade generally held the superior to be the most unethical, one's subordinates the least unethical, and peers in between. The dichotomy in the two studies found here deserves further study.

CHANGING THE ETHICAL CLIMATE

The USAWC Professionalism Study found that the present climate was not self-correcting, and because of the nature and extent of the problem, changes must be credibly institutionalized by the Army's top leadership. It found that correcting the climate would take more than superficial transitory measures. Specific modifications must occur in the systems of reward and punishment to support adherence to the time-honored ethical principles of the Officer Corps. The corrective measures should be reasonably self-sustaining--enduring without constant admonition--if they're going to be designed for long term changes and effectiveness. One of the specific recommendations of the Professionalism Study was to include the subject of professional ethics in the curriculum of Army Service Schools. The purpose of this was to recognize reality and accept responsibility for implementing corrections that are essential to constructive change. The Service Schools are conduits to the heart of the Officer Corps.

The PME Study underscores the need for a better system of rewards and punishment for deviant, unethical behavior in the Officer Corps. Nearly 30% of the respondents felt that unethical behavior was "Moderately Often" to "Usually" rewarded by the system. Similarly, 63% of the officers felt that being ethical, being frank, and "telling it like it is" is "Moderately" to "Usually" unrewarded by the Army. Both studies reflect a strong need for positive reinforcement of ethical principles. With respect to instruction in professional ethics at Service Schools, nearly 2/3 of the PME study respondents felt that the present instruction was "Non-Existent" to "Moderately Ineffective". Company grade officers felt stronger about this than field grade officers, as did USMA graduates compared to non-USMA graduates. More than 3/4 of the officers uniformly felt there should be "More" to "Much More" emphasis placed on teaching professional military ethics in Service Schools. (There were no differences in this response with respect to rank, sex, source of commission, branch, etc.) Because of the recent TRADOC emphasis on "exportable training" out to units in the field, several similar questions were asked about TOE units. The response was about the same compared to Service Schools. Two thirds of the officers felt that ethical training programs were "Non-Existent" to "Moderately Ineffective" in TOE units, and the "More" to "Much More" emphasis should be placed on teaching professional ethics in field units.

"DUTY, HONOR, COUNTRY"

The USAWC Professionalism Study found that the ideal standards of ethical/moral/professional behavior, as epitomized by the motto, "Duty, Honor, Country", were accepted by the officer corps as proper, meaningful, and relevant for the

Army. The study found especially reassuring the "vigorous, intelligent outlook" of the junior officers, individuals commissioned in the past three to seven years. They reflected as a group a deep commitment to the ideal of "Duty, Honor, Country" which to them characterized individual integrity, mutual trust and confidence and unselfish motivation. They were intolerant of others--whether peers, subordinates or superiors who deviated from these ethical norms. They professed an acceptance of "Duty, Honor, Country" as strongly as did their superiors. As mentioned earlier in this Chapter though, officers of all grades perceived a significant difference between the ideal values, epitomized by "Duty, Honor, Country", and the actual values observed in practice by the officer corps.

Empirical data resulting from the PME Study found substantially the same acceptance of the code "Duty, Honor, Country". Responding to the question of "Duty, Honor, Country" as an informal code acceptable to the officer corps, nearly 3/4 of the study respondents (73%) agreed. (USMA graduates did not skew this to the extent one might expect; overall they only made up 14% of the total sample.) Two biographical variables were statistically significant in accepting "Duty, Honor, Country". As might be expected, USMA graduates were more supportive than non-USMA graduates, and company grade officers favored the "Duty, Honor, Country" code more than field grade officers. Respondents were also asked the extent to which they thought "Duty, Honor, Country" was effective in promoting ethical behavior. Here the responses parallel the differences perceived in relating ideal standards to ethical standards found in the USAWC Professionalism Study. While the general acceptance of the code was high as mentioned above, only 37% of the respondents felt that the code was effective in promoting ethical behavior. They seemed

to be saying that "Duty, Honor, Country" was all right, but it was not enough.

FORMALIZING A PROFESSIONAL CODE OF ETHICS

One of the items recommended by the USAWC Professionalism Study to be implemented soonest was that of ". . . promulgating an Officer's Creed, which would serve to highlight and summarize the ethical standards of the Officer's Corps." It was not designed to be a substitution for regulations or the Commissioning Oath, but to be used as a guide to officers in exercising their authority and performing their duties. The study did include a concise, comprehensive "Officer's Creed" for consideration, as directed by the CSA.

The subject of a written code for the Officers Corps is also addressed in the PME study. Officers were specifically asked whether they thought the Army should have a formalized professional code of ethics. The overall response was 2 to 1 in favor of a formalized code, with company grade officers more favorably inclined than field grade officers. Support was inversely proportional to rank, i.e., the higher the rank, the less favorable toward a formal code of professional military ethics.

SIMILARITY IN NARRATIVE WRITTEN THEMES

Qualitative data collected in the USAWC Professionalism Study was the result of interviews, group discussion and questionnaire narratives which were content analyzed according to selected divergence and variance themes, again representing the disparity between ideal and actual values.

The PME Study used responses from Question #34 (open ended questions soliciting comments on the subject of professional military ethics) which resulted in subjective comments by 600 officers. They qualitatively

addressed the ethical problems and the causes of those problems. In many cases, they conform very closely to the rationale derived from the 1970 USAWC Professionalism Study. The recurring narrative themes used to identify and explain causes of variance from the ideal values which emerged from the Professionalism Study are equated with similar subjective comments which evolve from the PME Study in Table 9.

Finally, both studies show, ". . . no significant evidence that contemporary sociological pressures were the primary causes of the differences perceived between the ideal and actual standards" . . . or reasons for unethical behaviors exhibited by the officer corps. The problems are largely generated internally--within the Army itself--and will only be solved as we deal with those problems honestly and directly.

TABLE 9

COMPARISON OF SUBJECTIVE THEMES WHICH IDENTIFY AND EXPLAIN
CAUSATION OF VALUE DISSIMILARITY/UNETHICAL CONDUCT1970 USAWC Professionalism Study1977 PME Study

Selfish and Ambitious Behavior; Passing the Buck	Cover Up to Look Good Tell Superiors What They Want to Hear
Mission Accomplishment - Regardless of Means or Importance	"Can Do"/"Zero Defects" Syndrome
Distortion of Reports - including OER	OERs - Career Survival Readiness Reports - AWOL Lack of Integrity in Senior Officers
Squelching Initiative - "Don't Rock the Boat"	Cover up to look good Tell Superiors What They Want to Hear
Varying Standards - Sustain Workload	"Can Do" Syndrome Cover up to look good Lack of Integrity in Senior Officers
Army System of Rewards	Cover up to look good "Can Do" Syndrome
Lying, Cheating, Stealing	Lack of Integrity in Senior Officers "Zero Defects" Syndrome "Cover Your Ass" Tell Supervisors What They Want to Hear Pressure on Junior Officers Cover up to look good
Tolerating Deviance	Leaders Set the Example Ethics Start at Highest Levels "Cover Your Ass"
No Time or Excuse for Failure	No Freedom to Fail "Zero Defects" Syndrome
Statistical Pressures	OER/Career Survival Readiness Report - AWOLs "Cover Your Ass" Cover up to look good
Improper Goals/Quotas	"Can Do" Syndrome
Pressure to Remain Competitive	OER/Career Survival Cover up to look good
Legalism	"Cover Your Ass"
Loyalty Up - not Down	Tell the Boss What he Wants to Hear Lack of Integrity Cover up to look good
Lack of Moral Courage/Self Discipline	"Cover Your Ass" Tell the Boss what he Wants to Hear Lack of Integrity in Senior Officers Cover up to look good "Can Do"/"Zero Defects" Syndrome

"To err is human, to forgive divine" -- tell me where that fits into the ethics of OERs, AGIS, CMMIs, 2715s, AWOLS, REUPs, SIDPERS, DRs, Congressionals, Image, Profession Reputation. The view of a senior looking down and perceiving your humanness jeopardizes his access to star(s) rank!"

LTC, ROTC graduate, USAWC, Carlisle Bks,
Male, Combat Arms

CHAPTER VI

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

IMPORTANCE OF ETHICAL CONDUCT

Conclusions.

The whole issue of professional military ethics and ethical behavior is an important one in the Officer Corps today. Based on the behavior of other officers, this sample of 2200+ felt ethical conduct should be even more of an issue. Nearly 1/3 felt that when officers acted unethically this sort of behavior was actually rewarded in some manner by the organization. In a similar vein, nearly 2/3 felt that behaving ethically, i.e., being honest, "telling it like it is", etc. was actually dysfunctional in that such behavior went unrewarded. Both of these conclusions point to a serious problem in our system of rewards and punishment in the maintenance of a strong, positive ethical system.

Sufficient appropriate action is not being taken by the Army against officers who act unethically. There is strong agreement that much greater emphasis should be placed on disciplinary action under these circumstances.

This study found that among the most unethical groups of officers as perceived by the sample population, superiors ranked first, with peers second and subordinates last. Possible explanations for this phenomenon, which differs from the 1970 USAWC Professionalism Study findings, are that superiors may be

perceived as making arbitrary, seemingly questionable decisions which may not be entirely understood by subordinates, and hence seem unethical. Subordinates behavior on the other hand, is a reflection on the leadership and example set by the boss. If the boss sees his subordinates as acting unethically, it would be a "de facto" admission of his own failings. The ranking of peers in the middle may be a function of self-identification with peers--same rank, same year group, etc.-- but also the fact that peers are not observed as frequently as one's superiors or subordinates. The view is a lateral one, and often not a frequent one.

Significant differences were found among those who felt a need for an outside channel for reporting the unethical conduct of brother officers. The groups less favorably inclined toward this outside channel are those which normally are considered making up the chain of command, i.e., senior officers, USMA graduates, males, and combat arms officers. Their position would be to maintain the "status quo", leaving the authority in the chain of command with which they identify as power holders in the system. On the other hand, junior officers, non-USMA graduates, female officers, and combat service support officers (such as chaplains), as power recipients in the chain of command equation, feel a helplessness in dealing with ethical dilemmas, not seeing the chain of command as effective, and look for another channel to communicate the issues. The differences in these groups as to the effectiveness of the chain of command dealing with reports of unethical conduct is significant, and deserves additional study on ways to reduce the divergence perceived between power holders and power recipients.

Most officers feel that their own understanding of professional military ethics is sufficient to make responsible, ethical decisions. Their feelings about

other officers' understanding though is less strong, and may be indicative of a general shortcoming throughout the Officer Corps--lacking a thorough understanding and the formal underpinnings necessary to deal with all the ramifications of unethical officer conduct found in the Army.

The most frequently mentioned ethical problems found in the Army today centered on competitive pressures placed on officers, lack of integrity perceived in senior officers, career survival through statistics, and little tolerance for mistakes. In the vernacular, these translate to CYA, OERs, Readiness Reports, "Can-do", and "Zero Defects".

Recommendations.

1. More emphasis must be placed on professional military ethics by the top leadership of the Army.

To be credible, emphasis on ethical conduct in the Officer Corps must start at the top. Leaders at all levels must set the example. Anything less will only increase the cynicism which already exists in the officer ranks in the perceptions of the "Do as I say, not as I do" syndrome. Issues of morality and integrity must receive a high priority in the issues of the day. The subject has a long term relevancy which requires that it remain a high priority, and not just periodically put on the "front burner".

More study is needed to explain the dichotomy which exists among various subgroups, discussed earlier, regarding the role of the chain of command in dealing with unethical conduct. If significantly different views continue to be held between the "power holders" and the "power recipients", the divergence in the values of trust and commitment within the Officer Corps as a whole will increase.

2. Take more cognizance of rewarding officer conduct requiring moral and ethical decisions.

This is difficult to articulate specifically because "rewards" as well as "moral/ethical decisions" are relative terms. Nonetheless, there should be positive inducement in the Army to promote healthy ethical decisions, to "choose the harder right, instead of the easier wrong". Rewards may be extrinsic or intrinsic--oftentimes a pat on the back or verbal reinforcement of the decision by the boss is sufficient. In any event, there should be a payoff for standing firm, being ethical and setting the example for others. Long term adherence to high ethical standards must result in positive feedback, otherwise the system will erode. This calls for realistic expectations by officers in the tasks they'll be called upon to perform. "Can-do" attitudes may be laudatory in the abstract, but there are obvious limits to the capabilities of people and units. Unrealistic objectives, often impossible to accomplish, serve to build high frustration levels or an inclination to hedge the truth. The old adage "outstanding performance is expected, nothing else is tolerated", epitomizes an environment which fosters unethical practices.

EFFECTIVENESS OF ARMY TRAINING PROGRAMS

Conclusions.

The study shows clearly that training programs throughout the Army are perceived to be generally ineffective in teaching professional military ethics. This applies to both Army Service Schools and to units in the field. Two thirds of all respondents attested to the ineffectiveness in Service Schools, with company grade officers feeling significantly stronger about it than field grade officers. This may be a function of the more limited number of schools which

they have attended, or another aspect of the cynicism among junior officers on the subject of ethical conduct that has emerged in this study. A difference was also found between USMA graduates and non-USMA graduates on the effectiveness of Army training programs, USMA graduates feeling more strongly about their ineffectiveness. A plausible explanation for this difference might be the mental comparison USMA graduates would make between formal training in ethics/honor while at West Point which consisted of the Honor System itself and many classes on honor throughout the four years of study, and that given in the officers basic and advanced courses.

More than 3/4 of the respondents felt there should be much more emphasis placed on teaching professional military ethics in Army Service Schools at all levels. The response was uniform throughout, with no differences noted among rank, sex, source of commission, branch, etc, highlighting the feeling among all officers that more needs to be done in the area of formal instruction in military ethics, and that Army Service Schools are the places to do it.

A similar feeling was expressed for more emphasis to be placed on military ethics in TOE units within the Army. Officers felt that the instructional emphasis in units was largely ineffective and urged more done in this area, along with other regular training. Officers currently assigned to TOE units felt particularly strong in this regard (75%). Overall, 2/3 of the respondents suggested more be done formally in the area of professional military ethics within units in the field. It must also be pointed out, however, that 28% were "Undecided" on how much emphasis should be placed on ethical training down at the unit level. The ambivalence was also expressed verbally by respondents by such comments as, "Formal training really isn't necessary; leaders set the example in this unit" (role modeling) and "How in the dickens can we fit ethics into the training schedule--we don't have time enough now for all the mandatory training!"

Recommendations.

3. Incorporate regular, systematic instruction on professional military ethics into the core curriculum at all Army Service Schools (including pre-commission courses--OCS, ROTC, USMA).

Instruction today is by no means non-existent in the Service School system. In fact, some schools have excellent instructional programs in the area of ethics, integrity, honor, etc. Unfortunately, the effectiveness of most school instruction is not systematic as officers progress from one school level to another. Most "good" programs are a product of particularly conscientious instructors, or school commandants who have emphasized an ethical focus in their branch instruction. While this is commendable, it is not enough because it's personalized--not systematic or self-sustaining.

A thorough understanding of professional military ethics must pervade the entire officer structure. Programs must be institutionalized at all levels, so that all officers receive exposure to ethical issues. The instruction should be built on a strong foundation beginning with the written works of Plato, Kant, St. Augustine, Nagel, Niebuhr, etc. With an understanding of the fundamental concepts of morality, ethics, and Just War theory, instruction can then be related to the practical realities of present day problems, but with a theoretical base upon which to rest for better interpretations, examinations and analyses. With this more formalized and broader background in the whole area of ethics, officers should be better prepared to deal with the real issues of the day. In this respect, the instruction must be realistic so that it relates to current issues which forces an exploration into the causes of the problems, and not just short term cures. Formalized instruction institutionalized at each Service School level, will eventually guarantee that we have an entire Officer Corps which has a more sophisticated knowledge and understanding of the ethics of our profession.

4. Develop "exportable training packages" dealing with professional military ethics for Army units in the field.

Programs of this type would be structured differently from the classroom orientation of Service Schools. The approach would be more pragmatic. The chain of command would play a major role in developing programs which are realistic and instructional. Formal lectures from the school environment would be supplanted with regular officers' calls and solicit open discussion about ethical behavior required in decisions dealing with readiness reporting, and unit and individual effectiveness. Role modeling by leaders is another subject of discussion in this setting, since leaders invariably influence those around them, hopefully in a positive vein, but influence nonetheless, one way or the other.

The Organization Effectiveness (OE) process lends itself to these training packages. The role of unit OE Staff Officers can be significant in assisting commanders in surfacing ethical issues which are perceived by members of the unit as impacting on unit effectiveness, esprit, cohesion and solidarity. Team building exercises can be used not only to problem-solve and build unit commitment, but act as a catalyst in airing and discussing issues involving ethical conduct of all members of the unit.

The monograph series being prepared by the USA ADMIN CENTER appears to have considerable potential as part of a unit exportable training package. Monographs on the subject of leadership, ethics, integrity, etc. could be easily adapted to unit discussions and make excellent background reading material upon which to base an officers' call. Army wide distribution to each officer of this monograph series together with a folder in which to keep the literature, would seem to be excellent way of systematically communicating to everyone the

important messages the Army will be sending out to the Officer Corps on professional military ethics.

FORMALIZING MOTTOS AND PROFESSIONAL CODES OF CONDUCT

Conclusions.

"Duty, Honor, Country" is a motto which is acceptable to a large percentage of Army officers (73%), but its effectiveness in promoting ethical behavior among officers has been strongly questioned. What has emerged is a motto for the officer's corps which sounds good, but isn't really accomplishing much.

The problem may well be one of articulation. What does "Duty, Honor, Country" really mean? What is one's "Duty", and how does it interface with other aspects of an officer's life--family, religion, role as a citizen? The same general questions can be asked of "Honor" and "Country" as to one's understanding of the words and their relevance to Service life today. If officers don't have a broad, sophisticated understanding of their motto, it's very difficult to relate "Duty, Honor, Country" to the problems they confront daily.

Officers also felt that the Army should have a formalized, written code of conduct by a ratio of 2 to 1. Junior officers feel more strongly about this than do senior officers. These findings generally correspond to those of the 1970 USAWC Professionalism Study.

The Army has never had a written code per se, as with other professions, but has relied instead on the Officer's commissioning oath and the Armed Force Code of Conduct. Subjective written comments from respondents in this study showed that the need for a formal code ranked #3 among issues most discussed. Ranked #11 and #22 respectively were the admonitions to "enforce the codes we have, don't add new ones" and "use the chain of command more effectively to support the regulations we currently have".

Recommendations.

5. Provide an in-depth articulation of the philosophy and concepts embodied in the motto, "Duty, Honor, Country".

This, too, should be promulgated to each officer in the Army, and used as a discussion topic at officer's calls and seminars so that the concepts can be thoroughly developed, thought about, understood and internalized by the Officer Corps. These concepts should explain in detail the origins of "Duty, Honor, Country", what they have intended to convey over the years, why they have remained traditionally relevant, why the motto was adopted at Military Academy and subsequently by the Officer Corps, and finally, how it relates today to the contemporary Army environment. As already discussed above in Recommendation #4, one of the most productive ways to convey the articulation and philosophy of "Duty, Honor, Country" is through a series of well-written monographs distributed throughout the Army.

6. Re-examine the issues of a written code of professional military ethics to determine if a formalized instrument would be more conducive to promoting ethical behavior.

Recognizing that no simple code can be inclusive for all people, it can still be a guide upon which to build an ethical base, as are the professional creeds of other professions. A delicate balance exists here. The military code must be broad enough to have sufficient applicability to real-life situations, but not so broad as to be so ambiguous and all-inclusive that it can't focus on specific issues. On the other hand, the code must not be so restrictive that it stifles initiative or inhibits the development of self discipline which must take place within each officer. A "wallet-sized card" approach would be a cop-out in this respect.

The worthwhileness of a formal code of military ethics will be determined by its long term effectiveness in developing and encouraging positive ethical incentives in the Army. The majority of the officers favors a formalized code. This in itself adds significance to the question, and suggests a readdressal of the issue.

Finally, consideration should be given to conducting a ceremony throughout the Army each year whereupon each officer repeats his commissioning oath or officer's creed and re-affirms his allegiance to the Profession of Arms. (Similar to USMC officers on the Marine Corps birthday.) A symbolic gesture such as this, done annually on the Army's birthday, would add significance to the oath and act as a reminder to each officer of the meaning of his commission and the "raison d'etre" of the U.S. Army.

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
US ARMY WAR COLLEGE
CARLISLE BARRACKS, PENNSYLVANIA 17013

IN REPLY REFER TO:

16 March 1977

MEMORANDUM FOR: Survey Recipients

SUBJECT: U. S. Army War College Student Study Project

1. You are being asked to complete a questionnaire which is part of a student study project at the U. S. Army War College. The study deals with three basic issues - ethical conduct among Army officers; effectiveness of Army training programs to teach ethics; and a formalized professional military code of conduct.

2. I believe that the study results will be of interest and use to the Army. For that reason, I solicit your support in taking a few minutes to fill out the questionnaire, and returning it in the attached envelope. Your participation is strictly voluntary. The survey has been designed to safeguard your privacy.

Thanks for your support!

MELVILLE A. DRISKO, JR.

LTC

INF

USAWC Class of 1977

MILPERCEN Survey No. 77-14

MILITARY TRAINING IN PROFESSIONAL MILITARY ETHICS

GENERAL INSTRUCTIONS TO RESPONDENTS

1. Please respond to each question based on your experience and perception of the importance of the subject matter. No effort will be made to link responses to individuals. The biographical data is solely for statistical purposes.
2. Use only No. 2 pencil when filling out the answer sheet.
3. To prevent a link between you and your responses, do not place your name or Social Security No. anywhere on the answer sheet.
4. Read each question and all its responses carefully before selecting your answer. If any question is not clear to you, ask for help from the survey supervisor.
5. Be sure the question number on the answer sheet is the same as the number of the question you are answering.
6. Select only one response to each question. Mark the box on the answer sheet that corresponds to the response you selected from the questionnaire. Fill in the box with a heavy mark. Answer all questions.
7. Please do not fold the answer sheet.

PART I. BIOGRAPHICAL DATA

1. What is your rank?
 1. 2LT
 2. 1LT
 3. CPT
 4. MAJ
 5. LTC
 6. COL
2. What was your source of commission?
 1. USMA
 2. ROTC
 3. OCS
 4. Direct
 5. Other
3. Sex?
 1. Male
 2. Female
4. In which of the following branch categories are you presently serving?
 1. Combat (Inf, Armor, FA, ADA)
 2. Combat Support (Engr, MI, MP, SigC, CmlC)
 3. Combat Service Support (AGC, MC, DC, MSC, VC, AMSC, CH, ANC, JAG, FC, QMC, OrdC, TC, Prof USMA)

5. Where are you presently assigned?
 1. Ft Bragg, NC
 2. Ft Benning, GA
 3. Ft Lee, VA
 4. Carlisle Bks, PA
 5. Ft Riley, KS
 6. Ft Leavenworth, KS
 7. Ft Carson, CO
 8. Ft Belvoir, VA
6. What is your current type of assignment?
 1. Assigned to TOE unit
 2. Student
 3. Faculty member
 4. Other
7. What is your civilian education level?
 1. HS grad/GED
 2. 2 yr college equiv
 3. 4 yr college grad
 4. Some graduate school
 5. Master's degree
 6. Doctorate/prof degree
8. What is the highest military school you have attended or are now attending?
 1. Basic course
 2. Advanced course
 3. C&GSC/AFSC
 4. Senior service college
 5. Other
9. What is the highest level of command (or equivalent) you've held?
 1. None
 2. Platoon
 3. Company/detachment
 4. Battalion
 5. Brigade
10. What is the highest staff level at which you've served?
 1. None
 2. Battalion
 3. Brigade
 4. Division
 5. Corps
 6. Major Cmd (FORSCOM, TRADOC, etc)
 7. DA, JCS, DOD

PART II. TRAINING IN PROFESSIONAL MILITARY ETHICS

The term "ethical" conduct refers to complying with and enforcing standards of behavior which are accepted by the society at large (laws, norms, codes), and the Army in particular (rules, regulations, customs, codes of conduct). "Unethical" conduct refers to noncompliance with these standards of behavior.

11. Do you think the subject of ethical behavior is an important issue for Army officers today?

1. Not important
2. Moderately unimportant
3. Undecided
4. Moderately important
5. Very important

12. Based on the behaviors of fellow officers you have observed, ethical conduct should be more of an issue than it is.

1. Strongly disagree
2. Moderately disagree
3. Undecided
4. Moderately agree
5. Strongly agree

13. Have you ever seen a fellow officer intentionally do something on duty you thought was unethical?

1. Yes
2. No

14. How many specific instances of unethical behavior by Army officers have you observed in the past 12 months?

1. Never
2. 1-5 times
3. 6-10 times
4. 11-20 times
5. More than 20 times

15. From your observations, when officers act unethically, how often is such behavior favorably rewarded?

1. Rarely
2. Occasionally
3. Undecided
4. Moderately often
5. Usually

16. How often do you think ethical behavior, such as being frank, honest, "telling it as it is", goes unrewarded?

1. Rarely
2. Occasionally
3. Undecided
4. Moderately often
5. Usually

17. Compared to 10 years ago, how much unethical behavior do you think there is now among Army officers?

1. Much less now
2. Less now
3. No change in 10 yrs
4. More now
5. Much more now
6. Don't know; wasn't in the Army 10 yrs ago

18. Of all the officers you have known in the Army, how many acted so unethically as to warrant dismissal from the Service?

1. 100%
2. 80-99%
3. 50-79%
4. 20-49%
5. 10-29%
6. Less than 10%
7. 0%

19. Of all the officers you have known in the Army, how many have behaved unethically enough to warrant corrective action, but not dismissal?

1. 100%
2. 80-99%
3. 50-79%
4. 20-49%
5. 10-29%
6. Less than 10%
7. 0%

20. How often do you think the Army takes appropriate action against officers who act unethically?

1. Rarely
2. Occasionally
3. Undecided
4. Moderately often
5. Usually

21. How much emphasis should the Army place on taking disciplinary action against officers who act unethically?

1. Too much emphasis already
2. None
3. Slight
4. Moderate
5. Great
6. Very great

22. Which one of the following groups of officers in your opinion tends to behave most unethically?

1. My subordinates
2. My peers
3. My superiors
4. None of the above
5. Undecided

23. There should be a channel, outside of the chain of command, for reporting unethical conduct by peers and superiors.

1. Strongly disagree
2. Moderately disagree
3. Undecided
4. Moderately agree
5. Strongly agree

24. Of all the officers you have known, what percent do you think have a sufficient understanding of professional military ethics to make responsible, ethical decisions?

1. 100%
2. 80-99%
3. 50-79%
4. 20-49%
5. 10-19%
6. Less than 10%
7. 0%

25. How would you evaluate your own understanding of professional military ethics?

1. Very good
2. Good
3. Adequate
4. Inadequate
5. Poor
6. Very poor

26. Based on the most recent Army school you attended, do you think the Army school system has effective training programs for teaching professional military ethics?

1. Programs non-existent
2. Very ineffective
3. Moderately ineffective
4. Moderately effective
5. Very effective

27. How much emphasis should be placed on teaching professional military ethics in Army service schools?

1. Much less than now
2. Less than now
3. Undecided
4. More than now
5. Much more than now

28. How effective do you think the training programs on professional military ethics are in TOE organizations?

1. Programs non-existent
2. Very ineffective
3. Moderately ineffective
4. Undecided
5. Moderately effective
6. Very effective
7. Don't know; have not served in a TOE organization

29. How much emphasis should be placed on training programs dealing with professional military ethics in TOE organizations?

1. Much less than now
2. Less than now
3. Undecided
4. More than now
5. Much more than now

30. Do you think that the informal code, "Duty, Honor, Country" is acceptable to the officer corps?

1. Yes
2. No
3. Don't know

31. How effective do you think the code "Duty, Honor, Country" is in promoting ethical behavior?

1. Very ineffective
2. Moderately ineffective
3. Undecided
4. Moderately effective
5. Very effective

32. Do you think the Army should have a formalized professional code of ethics?

1. Yes
2. No
3. Undecided

33. How could a formalized code of ethics be enforced in the Army?
1. Used as a guide only, because it can't be enforced.
 2. Let the officer corps police itself; e.g., counsel violators.
 3. Violations mentioned on OERs.
 4. Administratively enforced through rules and regulations; e.g., letter of reprimand.
 5. Enforced through the UCMJ; e.g., court martial.

34. If you have any ideas or comments you think might be helpful on the subject of professional military ethics, Army training programs that deal with ethical conduct, or any other subject that may have occurred to you while you were filling out this questionnaire, please write them in the space below. (Do not write your comments on the answer sheet - write them below, on this questionnaire.)

THANKS FOR YOUR TIME AND EFFORT!!

(Please place this questionnaire and the completed answer sheet in the attached envelope and return it to the survey monitor from whom you received it.)

SUMMARY REPORT
 ***MILITARY TRAINING IN PROFESSIONAL MILITARY ETHICS

QUESTION NUMBER	1	2
BANK	SOURCE OF COMMISSION	
* RESPONSE	* RESPONSE	* FREQUENCY %
* 1	* 1	* 318 14.4
* 2	* 2	* 1175 53.0
* 3	* 3	* 399 18.0
* 4	* 4	* 278 12.6
* 5	* 5	* 45 2.0
* 6	* 6	
* TOTAL = 2209	* TOTAL = 2215	
* AVERAGE = 3.07	* AVERAGE = 2.35	
* STANDARD DEVIATION = 1.47	* STANDARD DEVIATION = 0.94	
* THERE IS A .95 PROBABILITY THAT THE	* THERE IS A .95 PROBABILITY THAT THE	
* TRUE MEAN OF THE POPULATION FROM	* TRUE MEAN OF THE POPULATION FROM	
* WHICH THIS SAMPLE WAS DRAWN IS	* WHICH THIS SAMPLE WAS DRAWN IS	
* BETWEEN 3.01 AND 3.13	* BETWEEN 2.31 AND 2.39	

QUESTION NUMBER	3	4
B SEX	BRANCH CATEGORY	
* RESPONSE	* RESPONSE	* FREQUENCY %
* 1	* 1	* 1023 46.8
* 2	* 2	* 522 28.5
* 3	* 3	* 541 24.7
* TOTAL = 2201	* TOTAL = 2186	
* AVERAGE = 1.10	* AVERAGE = 1.78	
* STANDARD DEVIATION = 0.30	* STANDARD DEVIATION = 0.82	
* THERE IS A .95 PROBABILITY THAT THE	* THERE IS A .95 PROBABILITY THAT THE	
* TRUE MEAN OF THE POPULATION FROM	* TRUE MEAN OF THE POPULATION FROM	
* WHICH THIS SAMPLE WAS DRAWN IS	* WHICH THIS SAMPLE WAS DRAWN IS	
* BETWEEN 1.09 AND 1.12	* BETWEEN 1.74 AND 1.81	

QUESTION NUMBER 5

PCST TO WHICH ASSIGNED

RESPONSE	FREQUENCY	%
1	300	13.6
2	388	17.6
3	97	4.4
4	235	10.6
5	232	10.5
6	340	15.4
7	252	11.3
8	242	11.0
9	67	3.0
10	59	2.7

TOTAL = 2210

AVERAGE = 4.70

STANDARD DEVIATION = 2.59

THERE IS A .95 PROBABILITY THAT THE

TRUE MEAN OF THE POPULATION FROM

WHICH THIS SAMPLE WAS DRAWN IS

BETWEEN 4.59 AND 4.81

QUESTION NUMBER 6

TYPE OF ASSIGNMENT

RESPONSE	FREQUENCY	%
1	765	34.6
2	1050	47.4
3	241	10.9
4	157	7.1

TOTAL = 2213

AVERAGE = 1.91

STANDARD DEVIATION = 0.85

THERE IS A .95 PROBABILITY THAT THE

TRUE MEAN OF THE POPULATION FROM

WHICH THIS SAMPLE WAS DRAWN IS

BETWEEN 1.87 AND 1.94

QUESTION NUMBER 7

CIVILIAN EDUCATION LEVEL

RESPONSE	FREQUENCY	%
1	19	0.9
2	107	4.8
3	942	42.6
4	376	17.0
5	691	31.3
6	74	3.3

TOTAL = 2209

AVERAGE = 3.83

STANDARD DEVIATION = 1.06

THERE IS A .95 PROBABILITY THAT THE

TRUE MEAN OF THE POPULATION FROM

WHICH THIS SAMPLE WAS DRAWN IS

BETWEEN 3.79 AND 3.88

QUESTION NUMBER 8

HIGHEST MILITARY SCHOOL ATTENDED

RESPONSE	FREQUENCY	%
1	778	35.4
2	686	31.2
3	475	21.6
4	234	10.6
5	27	1.2

TOTAL = 2200

AVERAGE = 2.11

STANDARD DEVIATION = 1.05

THERE IS A .95 PROBABILITY THAT THE

TRUE MEAN OF THE POPULATION FROM

WHICH THIS SAMPLE WAS DRAWN IS

BETWEEN 2.07 AND 2.16

QUESTION NUMBER 13

FELLOW OFFICERS INTENTIONALLY UNETHICAL

 * RESPONSE *
 * 1785 80.9 *
 * 421 19.1 *
 * 20.0 *
 * 278 12.6 *
 * 112 5.1 *
 * 140 6.3 *
 * TOTAL = 2206 *
 * AVERAGE = 1.19 *
 * STANDARD DEVIATION = 0.32 *
 * THERE IS A .95 PROBABILITY THAT THE *
 * TRUE MEAN OF THE POPULATION FROM *
 * WHICH THIS SAMPLE WAS DRAWN IS *
 * BETWEEN 1.17 AND 1.21 *

QUESTION NUMBER 14

HOW MANY INSTANCES IN LAST 12 MONTHS

 * RESPONSE *
 * 442 20.0 *
 * 1236 56.0 *
 * 278 12.6 *
 * 112 5.1 *
 * 140 6.3 *
 * TOTAL = 2208 *
 * AVERAGE = 2.22 *
 * STANDARD DEVIATION = 1.03 *
 * THERE IS A .95 PROBABILITY THAT THE *
 * TRUE MEAN OF THE POPULATION FROM *
 * WHICH THIS SAMPLE WAS DRAWN IS *
 * BETWEEN 2.17 AND 2.26 *

QUESTION NUMBER 15

HOW OFTEN UNETHICAL BEH. REWARDED

 * RESPONSE *
 * 458 20.8 *
 * 701 31.8 *
 * 420 19.0 *
 * 457 20.7 *
 * 169 7.7 *
 * TOTAL = 2205 *
 * AVERAGE = 2.63 *
 * STANDARD DEVIATION = 1.23 *
 * THERE IS A .95 PROBABILITY THAT THE *
 * TRUE MEAN OF THE POPULATION FROM *
 * WHICH THIS SAMPLE WAS DRAWN IS *
 * BETWEEN 2.57 AND 2.68 *

QUESTION NUMBER 16

HOW OFTEN ETHICAL BEH. UNREWARDED

 * RESPONSE *
 * 124 5.6 *
 * 518 23.5 *
 * 177 8.0 *
 * 898 40.3 *
 * 483 22.0 *
 * TOTAL = 2200 *
 * AVERAGE = 3.50 *
 * STANDARD DEVIATION = 1.22 *
 * THERE IS A .95 PROBABILITY THAT THE *
 * TRUE MEAN OF THE POPULATION FROM *
 * WHICH THIS SAMPLE WAS DRAWN IS *
 * BETWEEN 3.45 AND 3.55 *

QUESTION NUMBER 17

QUESTION NUMBER 17 -----
COMPARED TO 10 YRS AGO, HOW UNETHICAL

BY REQUESTED

UNETHICAL BEHAVIOR SHOULD BE DISMISSED

RESPONSE	FREQUENCY	%
12	71	3.2
2	348	15.8
3	398	18.0
4	477	21.6
5	120	5.4
6	791	35.9

* * * * *	RESPONSE	FREQUENCY	%	* * * * *
* *	1	5	0.2	* *
* *	2	14	0.6	* *
* *	3	18	0.8	* *
* *	4	44	2.0	* *
* *	5	171	7.8	* *
* *	6	1492	65.4	* *
* *	7	512	23.2	* *

TOTAL	=	2205	*
AVERAGE	=	4.18	*
STANDARD DEVIATION	=	1.60	*
THERE IS A .95 PROBABILITY THAT THE			*
TRUE MEAN OF THE POPULATION FROM			*
WHICH THIS SAMPLE WAS DRAWN IS			*
BETWEEN	4.11 AND	4.25	*

```

** TOTAL = 2206
** AVERAGE = 6.05
** STANDARD DEVIATION = 0.79
** THERE IS A .95 PROBABILITY THAT THE
** TRUE MEAN OF THE POPULATION FROM
** WHICH THIS SAMPLE WAS DRAWN IS
** BETWEEN 6.02 AND 6.09

```

QUESTION NUMBER 19

QUESTION NUMBER 19
UNETHICAL BEHAVIOR-CORRECTIVE ACTION ONLY

QUESTION NUMBER 20

QUESTION NUMBER 20
DOES ARMY TAKE APPROPRIATE ACTION

[illegible]

RESPONSE	FREQUENCY	%
1	1000	45.4
2	714	32.4
3	235	11.6
4	131	6.0
5	101	4.6

```
*****  
** TOTAL = 2202 **  
** AVERAGE = 5.49 **  
** STANDARD DEVIATION = 1.09 **  
** THERE IS A .95 PROBABILITY THAT THE **  
** TRUE MEAN OF THE POPULATION FROM **  
** WHICH THIS SAMPLE WAS DRAWN IS **  
** BETWEEN 5.45 AND 5.54 **
```

```
* TOTAL = 2201 *
* AVERAGE = 1.92 *
* STANDARD DEVIATION = 1.10 *
* THERE IS A .95 PROBABILITY THAT THE *
* TRUE MEAN OF THE POPULATION FROM *
* WHICH THIS SAMPLE WAS DRAWN IS *
* BETWEEN 1.87 AND 1.97 *
*****
```

QUESTION NUMBER 21
HOW MUCH ARMY EMPHASIS SHOULD BE PLACED

RESPONSE	FREQUENCY	%
1	31	1.4
2	25	1.1
3	121	5.5
4	614	27.7
5	975	43.0
6	449	20.3

TOTAL = 2215
 AVERAGE = 4.73
 STANDARD DEVIATION = 0.97
 THERE IS A .95 PROBABILITY THAT THE
 TRUE MEAN OF THE POPULATION FROM
 WHICH THIS SAMPLE WAS DRAWN IS
 BETWEEN 4.69 AND 4.77

QUESTION NUMBER 22
WHICH OFFICER GROUP ACTS MOST UNETHICALLY

RESPONSE	FREQUENCY	%
1	92	4.2
2	377	17.1
3	706	32.0
4	205	9.3
5	825	37.4

TOTAL = 2205
 AVERAGE = 3.59
 STANDARD DEVIATION = 1.26
 THERE IS A .95 PROBABILITY THAT THE
 TRUE MEAN OF THE POPULATION FROM
 WHICH THIS SAMPLE WAS DRAWN IS
 BETWEEN 3.53 AND 3.64

QUESTION NUMBER 23
OUTSIDE CHANNEL TO REPORT UNETHICAL BEH

RESPONSE	FREQUENCY	%
1	704	31.9
2	311	14.1
3	352	16.0
4	521	23.6
5	317	14.4

TOTAL = 2205
 AVERAGE = 2.74
 STANDARD DEVIATION = 1.47
 THERE IS A .95 PROBABILITY THAT THE
 TRUE MEAN OF THE POPULATION FROM
 WHICH THIS SAMPLE WAS DRAWN IS
 BETWEEN 2.68 AND 2.81

QUESTION NUMBER 24
WHAT PERCENT OFFICERS UNDERSTAND ETHICS

RESPONSE	FREQUENCY	%
1	210	9.6
2	1275	58.1
3	440	20.0
4	140	7.3
5	57	2.6
6	66	3.1
7	8	0.4

TOTAL = 2196
 AVERAGE = 2.43
 STANDARD DEVIATION = 1.03
 THERE IS A .95 PROBABILITY THAT THE
 TRUE MEAN OF THE POPULATION FROM
 WHICH THIS SAMPLE WAS DRAWN IS
 BETWEEN 2.39 AND 2.47

QUESTION NUMBER 25

YOUR OWN UNDERSTANDING OF PROF. MIL. ETHICS

RESPONSE	FREQUENCY	%	FREQUENCY	%
1	919	41.5	451	20.4
2	870	39.3	529	24.0
3	347	15.7	453	20.5
4	57	2.6	672	30.4
5	19	0.9	103	4.7
6	0	0.		

 * TOTAL = 2212
 * AVERAGE = 1.82
 * STANDARD DEVIATION = 0.85
 * THERE IS A .95 PROBABILITY THAT THE
 * TRUE MEAN OF THE POPULATION FROM
 * WHICH THIS SAMPLE WAS DRAWN IS
 * BETWEEN 1.79 AND 1.85

QUESTION NUMBER 26

DO ARMY SCHOOLS HAVE EFF. PROF. ETHICS TNG

RESPONSE	FREQUENCY	%
1	451	20.4
2	529	24.0
3	453	20.5
4	672	30.4
5	103	4.7

 * TOTAL = 2208
 * AVERAGE = 2.75
 * STANDARD DEVIATION = 1.22
 * THERE IS A .95 PROBABILITY THAT THE
 * TRUE MEAN OF THE POPULATION FROM
 * WHICH THIS SAMPLE WAS DRAWN IS
 * BETWEEN 2.60 AND 2.80

QUESTION NUMBER 27

HOW MUCH EMPHASIS IN ARMY SCHOOLS

RESPONSE	FREQUENCY	%
1	33	1.5
2	73	3.3
3	398	18.1
4	1286	58.4
5	411	18.7

 * TOTAL = 2201
 * AVERAGE = 3.89
 * STANDARD DEVIATION = 0.79
 * THERE IS A .95 PROBABILITY THAT THE
 * TRUE MEAN OF THE POPULATION FROM
 * WHICH THIS SAMPLE WAS DRAWN IS
 * BETWEEN 3.86 AND 3.93

QUESTION NUMBER 28

DO JOE UNITS HAVE EFF. PROF. ETHICS TNG

RESPONSE	FREQUENCY	%
1	795	36.2
2	414	18.9
3	249	11.3
4	292	13.3
5	203	9.2
6	20	0.9
7	222	10.1

 * TOTAL = 2195
 * AVERAGE = 2.84
 * STANDARD DEVIATION = 1.95
 * THERE IS A .95 PROBABILITY THAT THE
 * TRUE MEAN OF THE POPULATION FROM
 * WHICH THIS SAMPLE WAS DRAWN IS
 * BETWEEN 2.75 AND 2.92

QUESTION NUMBER 29

HOW MUCH EMPHASIS IN TOE UNITS

* RESPONSE	* FREQUENCY	* X
1	39	1.8
2	60	2.7
3	603	27.5
4	1165	53.1
5	327	14.9

* TOTAL = 2194		
* AVERAGE = 3.77		
* STANDARD DEVIATION = 0.80		
* THERE IS A .95 PROBABILITY THAT THE		
* TRUE MEAN OF THE POPULATION FROM		
* WHICH THIS SAMPLE WAS DRAWN IS		
* BETWEEN 3.73 AND 3.80		

QUESTION NUMBER 30

IS "DUTY, HONOR, COUNTRY" ACCEPTABLE AS CODE

* RESPONSE	* FREQUENCY	* X
1	1610	73.0
2	360	16.3
3	236	10.7

* TOTAL = 2206		
* AVERAGE = 1.38		
* STANDARD DEVIATION = 0.67		
* THERE IS A .95 PROBABILITY THAT THE		
* TRUE MEAN OF THE POPULATION FROM		
* WHICH THIS SAMPLE WAS DRAWN IS		
* BETWEEN 1.35 AND 1.41		

QUESTION NUMBER 31

DOES "D.H.C" PROMOTE ETHICAL BEHAVIOR

* RESPONSE	* FREQUENCY	* X
1	417	18.9
2	611	27.7
3	361	16.4
4	687	31.1
5	131	5.9

* TOTAL = 2207		
* AVERAGE = 2.78		
* STANDARD DEVIATION = 1.24		
* THERE IS A .95 PROBABILITY THAT THE		
* TRUE MEAN OF THE POPULATION FROM		
* WHICH THIS SAMPLE WAS DRAWN IS		
* BETWEEN 2.72 AND 2.83		

QUESTION NUMBER 32

SHOULD ARMY HAVE FORMAL CODE OF ETHICS

* RESPONSE	* FREQUENCY	* X
1	1202	54.8
2	586	26.7
3	404	18.4

* TOTAL = 2192		
* AVERAGE = 1.64		
* STANDARD DEVIATION = 0.77		
* THERE IS A .95 PROBABILITY THAT THE		
* TRUE MEAN OF THE POPULATION FROM		
* WHICH THIS SAMPLE WAS DRAWN IS		
* BETWEEN 1.60 AND 1.67		

QUESTION NUMBER 33

HOW DO WE ENFORCE A CODE

```

*****
* RESPONSE
* 1 486 23.1 *
* 2 667 31.6 *
* 3 279 13.2 *
* 4 444 21.1 *
* 5 232 11.0 *
*****
* TOTAL = 2108
* AVERAGE = 2.65
* STANDARD DEVIATION = 1.33
* THERE IS A .95 PROBABILITY THAT THE
* TRUE MEAN OF THE POPULATION FROM
* WHICH THIS SAMPLE WAS DRAWN IS
* BETWEEN 2.60 AND 2.71
*****

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